Abstract-Central cryptographic functionalities such as encryption, authentication, or secure two-party computation cannot be realized in an information-theoretically secure way from scratch. This serves as a motivation to study what (possibly weak) primitives they can be based on. We consider as such starting points general two-party input-output systems that do not allow for message transmission, and show that they can be used for realizing unconditionally secure bit commitment as soon as they are non-trivial, i.e., cannot be realized from distributed randomness only. In particular, our result implies that any twoqubit state without hidden-variable model has an input-output behavior allowing for unconditional bit commitment.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Bit Commitment
Modern cryptography deals -besides the classical tasks of encryption and authentication -with secure cooperation between two (or more) parties willing to collaborate but distrusting each other. Examples of important functionalities of such secure two-party computation are bit commitment and oblivious transfer. In this note, we concentrate on bit commitment, a primitive which, for instance, allows for fair coin flipping over the telephone [Blu83] and has central applications in interactive proof systems.
A bit commitment scheme is a pair of protocols, commit and open, executed by two parties, Alice and Bob. First, they execute commit where Alice chooses a bit b as input. Later, they execute open where Alice reveals the bit b to Bob. The security properties of bit commitment are the following. Security for Alice ensures that the commitment is hiding: The commit protocol should not give any information about the bit b to Bob. Security for Bob, on the other hand, means that after the execution of commit, b cannot be changed anymore by Alice. Ideally, one would like these security properties to hold in an information-theoretically secure way.
It is well known that bit commitment that is unconditionally secure for both parties cannot be implemented from (noiseless) classical commmunication only -and the same is true even for (noiseless) quantum communication [May97] , [LC97] . If one is not willing to reduce the security to being computational for one party or the other, it becomes a natural question what information-theoretic primitives allow for realizing unconditionally secure bit commitment. This question has been studied intensively by many authors already, and S. Winkler and S.Wolf are with the Computer Science Department, ETH Zürich, CH-8092 Zürich, Switzerland (e-mail: swinkler@ethz.ch; wolf@inf.ethz.ch).
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several optimistic results have been obtained: Bit commitment can be realized from communication over noisy channels [Cré97] , [WNI03] or from pieces of correlated randomness [IMQNW04] , [WW04] , [IMNW06] . The present article corrects and strongly extends preliminary results presented in [WW05a] .
B. Non-Local Correlations
Motivated by the fact that entangled quantum states can show a so-called non-local behavior, the question has been studied whether such correlations allow for realizing cryptographic primitives in an unconditionally secure way as well. A two-partite input-output system is characterized by a conditional distribution P XY |UV , where U and V stand for the inputs and X and Y for the outputs to the systems on the left and right hand sides of the system, respectively. Intuitively speaking, such a system is non-local if its behavior cannot be explained by pre-determined information. On the other hand, we only consider correlations that are, at the same time, nonsignaling, i.e., which do not allow for message transmission from one side to the other. An example of such a system is the non-local box (NL box for short) proposed by Popescu and Rohrlich [PR97] , the behavior of which is as follows: All variables are binary, each output is a uniform bit, independent of the pair of inputs, but X ⊕ Y = U ∧ V always holds. Interestingly, an NL box is, cryptographically speaking, the same as one-out-of-two bit oblivious transfer [WW05b] and, hence, does allow for realizing bit commitment as well. It has been argued that this did not contradict Mayers' no-go result because the classical system does, in contrast to a shared quantum state, not allow for a delay of one of the inputs, i.e., provides no output on either side before both inputs are given (a property that, actually, makes it signaling) [SGP05] . However, this explanation turned out to be wrong: NL boxes with delay still allow for bit commitment [BCU + 06] . A second explanation that was given is that NL boxes are more non-local than any quantum state. In contradiction to this intuition, we show that any non-local system providing binary outputs allows for unconditionally secure bit commitment. More precisely, we show an all-or-nothing result on such systems (Theorem 3): They are either simulatable with shared randomness, or allow for unconditional bit commitment; our condition is thus tight. This also means that the crucial difference to Mayers' result is that there, entangling attacks are possible, whereas we only consider the states' classical behavior.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Bit Commitment
A bit commitment scheme is a pair of protocols Commit and Open executed by two parties Alice and Bob. First, Alice and Bob execute Commit where Alice has a bit b as input. Bob either accepts or rejects the execution of Commit. Later, they execute Open where Bob has output (accept, b ′ ) or reject. The two protocols must have the following (ideal) properties:
• Correctness: If both parties follow the protocol, then Bob always accepts with b ′ = b.
• Hiding: If Alice is honest, then committing to b does not reveal any information about b to Bob.
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• Binding: If Bob is honest and accepts after the execution of Commit, then there exists only one value b ′ (which is equal to b, if Alice is honest) that Bob accepts as output after the execution of Open. In the following we call a bit commitment scheme secure, if it fulfills the above ideal requirements except with an error that can be made negligible (as a function of some security parameter n).
B. Notation
Let W : X → Y be a stochastic matrix with rows indexed by elements of X and columns indexed by elements of Y. We denote the entries of W by W (y|x) = W x (y) and the row vector indexed by x by W x . W x (·) defines a probability distribution on Y for every x ∈ X , i.e., for all x it holds that
We denote by conv(W ) the convex hull of the set {W x |x ∈ X }, i.e., the convex hull of the row vectors of W . We call W x0 an extreme point of this set if the convex hull of the set ({W x |x ∈ X }\{W x0 }) is strictly smaller. We denote the set of extreme points by extr(conv(W )). We call W z0 nonextreme if it is not an extreme point of conv(W ). We denote by x n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) a sequence of elements in X or a vector in X n . If I := {i 1 , . . . , i k } ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} then x I denotes the sub-sequence (x i1 , x i2 , . . . , x i k ) of x n . We denote by h(·) the binary entropy function.
We call a function f (n) ≥ 0 negligible if for any nonzero polynomial p(n), there exists n 0 such that
We call f (n) overwhelming if 1 − f (n) is negligible.
C. Non-Signaling Boxes
A non-signaling box is defined by a stochastic matrix with probability W (xy|uv). Furthermore, the following nonsignaling conditions must hold
i.e., the distribution of Alice's output is independent of Bob's input (and vice-versa). A party receives its output immediately after giving its input, independently of whether the other has given its input already. Note that this is possible, since the box is non-signaling. Furthermore, after a box is used once, it is destroyed. The set of non-signaling boxes can be divided into two types: local and non-local. A box is local if and only if it can be simulated by non-communicating parties with only shared randomness as a resource. This means that there exist probabilities p i and stochastic matrices V 
A box is called independent if there exist stochastic matrices V A , V B such that
i.e., such a box can be simulated without any resources at all. In the following we only consider boxes with binary outputs, i.e., X = Y = {0, 1}. We define
We call a box with binary outputs perfectly correlated for an input pair (u, v) ∈ U × V if
and perfectly anti-correlated if
D. Chernoff/Hoeffding Bounds
We will use the following bounds attributed to Chernoff [Che52] and Hoeffding [Hoe63] . Lemma 1. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be independent random variables with Pr[
E. Information Theory
We will use the smoothed versions of the min-entropy [RW04] . For an event E, let P XE|Y =y (x) be the probability that X = x and the event E occurs, conditioned on Y = y. We define
We will make use of the following lemma from [Cac97] , [MW97] , [RW05] .
Lemma 3. Let P XY Z be a probability distribution. For any ǫ, ǫ
The following lemma from [HR06] gives a lower bound for the smooth entropy of n-fold product distributions:
F. Randomness Extraction and Privacy Amplification
In information-theoretic and quantum key agreement, the final protocol step, where a highly secret key is generated from a longer but only weakly secure key, has been called privacy amplification. It is very closely related to randomness extraction; actually, it corresponds to the latter when viewed from a possible adversary's perspective.
Definition 1. [CW79] A function f : X × S → Y is called a 2-universal hash function if for all
Lemma 5 (Leftover hash lemma [BBR88] , [ILL89] , [BBCM95] ). Let f : X × S → Y be a 2-universal hash function with m > 0. Let X be a random variable over X and let ǫ > 0. If
G. Typical Sequences
In this section we will state and prove some basic results on typical sequences. More details on this topic can be found in the book by Csiszár and Körner [CK81] .
Definition 2. Let P be a probability distribution on X and ǫ > 0. Then the set of ǫ-typical sequences is defined as:
where N (x|x n ) denotes the number of letters x in x n .
Definition 3. For a stochastic matrix W : X → Z we define the set of W -typical sequences under the condition x n ∈ X n with constant ǫ as
The following two well-known lemmas follow directly from Lemma 1.
Using the results above we will prove a lemma that we will use in the security proofs in this paper. The lemma is similar to Lemma 14 in [WNI03] . Let W : X → Z be a (discrete memoryless) channel, let a ∈ X be an input such that the output distribution of a is not a convex combination of the other output distributions and let x n ,x n ∈ X n be sequences such that |{k : x k = a andx k = a}| ≥ κn. Then the lemma states that the output of the channel, given x n as input, will not be W -typical conditioned onx n with overwhelming probability if exp(−κ 2 n) is negligible.
Lemma 8. Let W : X → Z be a stochastic matrix and a ∈ X such that for all probability distributions P over X such that P (a) = 0 and
This implies that there exists b ∈ Z such that
We define independent binary random variables X k , k ∈ I a , with distributions
(assuming µ = 0). Using the Chernoff bound it follows that
III. IMPOSSIBILITY
Theorem 1. Let a local non-signaling box with binary output be defined by
and there exists u 0 ∈ U, v 0 ∈ V and b 0 , b 1 ∈ {0, 1} with:
then there is no reduction of information-theoretically secure bit commitment to the box W (with noiseless communication only).
Proof: We prove the statement by showing that one can securely implement such a box from noiseless communication and shared randomness alone. This would allow for bit commitment from noiseless communication which is impossible as mentioned above. The implementation just follows the definition of the box: Let λ be the shared random bit. Alice on input u outputs 0 with probability V λ A (0|u) and 1 with probability V λ A (1|u) = 1 − V λ A (0|u). Bob on input v outputs b ∈ {0, 1} with probability V λ B (b|v). This perfectly implements the behavior of the box. Furthermore, this implementation is secure, since Alice and Bob can get the same information (i.e. the shared randomness λ) if they only have black-box access to W , if they always input u 0 and v 0 , respectively.
IV. TWO PROTOCOLS
We will now give two slightly different protocols, which work for two different kinds of non-signaling boxes.
A. Protocol I
Informally, the first protocol works as follows: in the Commit protocol an honest Alice gives a fixed input to all her boxes, while Bob chooses his inputs randomly. Alice applies privacy amplification to the outputs of the boxes and uses the resulting key K to hide the bit B she wants to commit to. Alice then sends K ⊕ B and the randomness used for privacy amplification to Bob. In the Open protocol Alice sends her outputs from the boxes. Alice's input is chosen such that there is a statistical test that allows Bob to detect if Alice has changed more than O( √ n) output values while Bob has only limited information about the output of the boxes before the opening phase. A dishonest Alice might still be able to change O( √ n) output values. To ensure that this is not possible, we use a linear code and let Alice send parity check bits of the output to Bob in the Commit protocol. If the minimal distance of the code is large enough, no two strings with the same parity check bits lie in a hamming sphere with radius proportional to √ n.
Let Alice and Bob share n identical non-signaling boxes given by W : U ×V → {0, 1}
2 . In our protocol, we will require Bob to choose his input uniformly from V. For an honest Bob and a potentially malicious Alice, we can define a stochastic matrixŴ : {0, 1}×U → {0, 1}×V describing the probability of Bob's input and output values v and y, conditioned on Alice's input u and output x aŝ
if W A (x|u) = 0, and undefined otherwise. Furthermore, we will require an honest Alice to always input a fixed value u a to the box. For an honest Alice, and a potentially malicious Bob that chooses his input v ∈ {0, 1} freely, we can define random variables X v , Y v depending on Bob's input that describe the output of Alice and Bob, respectively, i.e. with a joint distribution
The protocol below is secure if there exists a value a = (x a , u a ) such that the following condition is fulfilled:
(1) There exists δ > 0 such that for all probability distributions P over {0, 1}
2 with P (a) = 0 it holds that
(2) There exists γ > 0 such that for all v ∈ V it holds that
i.e., the Shannon entropy of Alice's output given Bob's output is non-zero for all possible inputs of Bob.
We label the inputs of Alice as {0, . . . , |U| − 1}. Furthermore, we define the distribution of Alice's output x if her input is u a as P (x) := W A (x|u a ) for all x ∈ {0, 1}. Since we do not have to decode, this could be a random linear code chosen by Bob. Let l := γn − n(1 − R) − 4 √ nk − 3k. We choose k := n 2/3 , which implies that k, √ nk ∈ O(n 5/6 ) and k, k 2 /n, nǫ 2 ∈ Ω(n 1/3 ). It follows that l ∈ (γ + R − 1)n − O(n 5/6 ). If n is big enough, we have l > 0. Let ext : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l be a 2-universal hash function. We define syn(
Commit(b l ):
• Bob chooses v n ∈ R {0, 1} n • Alice and Bob input u n a and v n component-wise to the boxes. Alice gets x n ∈ {0, 1} n and Bob y n ∈ {0, 1} n .
• Alice chooses r ∈ R {0, 1} * and sends
Open():
• Alice sends Bob x n and b l .
• Bob checks:
• If all the checks pass successfully, Bob accepts and outputs b l , otherwise he rejects.
B. Security
Let u n := (u 1 , . . . , u n ) be Alice's input to the boxes, let x n := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be her outputs from the boxes and letx n := (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) be the values Alice sends to Bob in the opening phase. We define z n := ((x 1 , u 1 ) , . . . , (x n , u n )) andz n := ((x 1 , u a ) , . . . , (x n , u a )). Let r n := ((y 1 , v 1 ) , . . . , (y n , v n )) be Bob's inputs and outputs.
Lemma 9. The protocols Commit and Open satisfy the correctness condition.
Proof: Bob always accepts Commit. If Alice follows the protocol, then syn(x n ) and b l ⊕ ext(r 1 , u n ) are correct. From Lemma 7 it follows that
and from Lemma 6 it follows that
Thus, Bob accepts Open with overwhelming probability and outputs b l , the value Alice was committed to.
Lemma 10. The protocol Commit satisfies the privacy condition with an error negligible in n.
Proof: Let us assume that Alice is honest. Alice inputs u a into the boxes as required by the protocol, while Bob can choose its input v n = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) freely. We then define the random variables
Using Lemma 3 with get that
According to Lemma 5 Bob has no information about ext(r 1 , x n ) except with probability 2ǫ 1 + ǫ 1 .
Lemma 11.
If d H (x n ,x n ) ≥ k, then the probability that Bob acceptsx n is negligible in n.
since λ ≤ p/2 and δ ≤ 1. We distinguish two cases:
(1) n a ≤ (n − k/2): The expectation of N ((x a , u a )|z n ) is smaller than or equal to (n − k 2 )p. Since k 2 /n ∈ Ω(n 1/3 ), it follows from Lemma 1 that with overwhelming probability
But since Bob only accepts ifx n ∈ T n P,ǫ , we have
and the claim follows from Lemma 8.
(2) n a > (n − k/2): Then the expectation of N ((1 − x a , u a )|z n ) is greater than or equal to (n − k 2 )(1 − p). As k 2 /n ∈ Ω(n 1/3 ) Lemma 1 implies that with overwhelming probability
Lemma 12. The protocol satisfies the binding condition with an error negligible in n.
Proof: Any two strings s n =s n with syn(s n ) = syn(s n ) have distance at least d. So at least one of the two strings has distance at least k from Alice's output x n . The probability that Bob accepts this string in the opening phase is negligible according to lemma 11.
C. Protocol II
Protocol I is not hiding if for every fixed input of Alice a dishonest Bob can choose an input such that he has perfect information about Alice's output. This is the case for example with the above mentioned NL box. But, as shown in [BCU + 06] , this box allows for bit commitment. Therefore, we present a second protocol that allows to securely implement bit commitment for such boxes. The protocol works as follows: Alice gives random inputs to all her boxes. Then she applies privacy amplification to the string of inputs and uses the resulting key to hide the bit she is committed to. In the opening phase Alice sends all her inputs/outputs. Bob performs statistical tests on the input/output of Alice that allow him to detect if Alice has changed more than √ n values. We use again parity check bits of a linear code to make sure that a dishonest Alice cannot change √ n values except with negligible probability.
Alice and Bob share n identical non-signaling boxes given by W : U × V → {0, 1}
2 . We define the corresponding matrix W as in Section IV-A. In the following we always assume that W A (x|u) = 0 for all x ∈ {0, 1}, u ∈ U. For the following protocol to be secure we require W to fulfill the following condition:
Condition 2. There exist u 0 , u 1 ∈ U, u 0 = u 1 , such that the set D := {Ŵ 0u0 ,Ŵ 1u1 ,Ŵ 0u0 ,Ŵ 1u1 } contains at most one non-extreme point of conv(Ŵ ), i.e., there is c 0 ∈ {0u 0 , 1u 1 , 0u 0 , 1u 1 } such that for all c ∈ {0u 0 , 1u 1 , 0u 0 , 1u 1 }\{c 0 } it holds that for all probability distributions P with P (c) = 0
We label the inputs of Alice as {0, . . . , |U| − 1} and assume that u 0 = 0 and u 1 = 1. In the protocol, we will require Alice to choose her input uniformly from {0, 1}, and Bob to choose his input uniformly from V. If both are honest, the joint distribution of the inputs and outputs of Alice and Bob is
If Alice is honest, the joint distribution of her input and output is
Note that we assumed p 0 > 0 and that obviously we also have p 0 ≤ 1 2 . Let k 1 be the security parameter, k 2 := k 1 (4p 0 + 1)/2p Commit(b l ):
• Alice chooses u n ∈ R {0, 1} n , Bob chooses v n ∈ R V.
• Alice and Bob input u n and v n component-wise to the boxes. Alice gets x n ∈ {0, 1} n and Bob y n ∈ {0, 1} n .
• Alice chooses r 2 ∈ R {0, 1} * and sends
Open():
• Alice sends Bob u n , x n and b l .
• Bob checks: ((y 1 , v 1 ) , .., (y n , v n )) ∈ T n W ,ǫ ((x 1 , u 1 ) , .., (x n , u n )) - ((x 1 , u 1 ) , . . . , (x n , u n )) ∈ T n Q,ǫ
D. Security
Let z n := ((x 1 , u 1 ), . . . , (x n , u n )) be Alice's input and output,z n := ((x 1 ,ũ 1 ), . . . , (x n ,ũ n )) the values Alice sends to Bob in the opening phase and r n := ((y 1 , v 1 ), . . . , (y n , v n )) Bob's inputs and outputs. For all c ∈ ({0, 1} × U) we define the sets I c := {i :z i = c}.
Lemma 13. The protocols Commit and Open satisfy the correctness condition.
Proof: Bob always accepts Commit. If Alice follows the protocol, then syn(u n ), syn(x n ) and b l ⊕ ext(r 2 , u n ) are correct. From Lemma 7 it follows that
Lemma 14. The protocol Commit satisfies the privacy condition with an error negligible in n.
Proof: Let us assume that Alice is honest. Since the box is non-signaling, Bob's values Y n and V n are independent of U n . Since Alice chooses U n uniformly from {0, 1} n , we have
All the information Bob gets about U n is syn(U n ) and syn(X n ). Let ǫ 1 := 2 −k1 . Using Lemma 3 we get
If follows from Lemma 5 that extracting l bits makes the key uniform with an error of at most 2ǫ 1 = 2 ·2 −k1 . The statement follows.
The proof of the binding condition is slightly more involved. Because our boxes are non-signaling, Alice has the possibility of delaying her input to the box until the opening phase.
Hence, a general strategy for her is to give input to some of the boxes in the commit phase, and to delay the input to some of the boxes until the opening phase. And she may send incorrect values about her input/output to/from the boxes to Bob in the opening phase. Note that we can ignore the case where she does not give any input to some boxes, as she might as well just give input but ignore the output.
, then the probability that Bob acceptsz n is negligible.
Proof: For all w n ∈ T n Q,ǫ it holds that
Since λ ≤ min x,u Q(x, u)/4 ≤ 1/16 and δ ≤ 1. We distinguish the following two cases:
) it follows from Lemma 1 that with overwhelming probability
But since Bob only accepts ifz
32 k 1 , and the claim follows from Lemma 8.
(2) For all u ∈ {0, 1} we have |n/2 − N (u|u n )| ≤ k 1 /8: Since ǫ 2 n ∈ Ω(n 1/3 ) it follows from Lemma 7 that with overwhelming probability we have
32 k 1 , then the claim follows from Lemma 8. Otherwisez n / ∈ T n Q,ǫ . Next, we will prove a technical lemma:
Proof: Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be random variables with P r[X i = 1] = p and P r[X i = 0] = (1 − p). Let X = n i=1 X i . Then using Lemma 2 and setting t :
Lemma 17. If Alice does not input any values to at least k 2 boxes before sending syn(x n ) to Bob, then Bob does accept the opening of the protocol with negligible probability.
Proof: Alice does not give any input to at least k 2 boxes before sending a syndrome s 0 to Bob. Later she gives her inputs to the remaining k 2 boxes and gets a random output x i for each box. We know that any two strings s n = s n with syn(s n ) = syn(s n ) have distance at least d > 2k 2 . We can bound the probability that the output string has distance at most k 1 to a string with syndrome s 0 by
Note that since 4p 0 + 1 > 1 and 2p 0 ≤ 1, we have p 0 k 2 ≥ k 1 . So we can apply Lemma 16 and get an upper bound on this probability of
The statement now follows from Lemma 15. 
V. TIGHTNESS OF OUR RESULTS
In this section we show that every non-signaling box with binary outputs that cannot be securely implemented from shared randomness allows to realise bit commitment with one of the above protocols.
2 be a non-signaling box with |U| ≥ 2. If there exists (x 0 , u 0 ) such that either 
for all y ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ V. It follows from the non-signaling conditions that
for all y ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ V. We assume x 0 = x 1 = 0. Then we can simulate W usingW in the following way: Alice gives input u 0 toW and gets output x. If x = 1, then Alice outputs 1. If x = 0, then Alice outputs 0 with probability p and 1 with probability 1 − p. If W A (x 0 |u 0 ) = 0 orŴ 0u0 =Ŵ 1u0 , then Alice on input u 0 outputs 0 with probability W A (0|u 0 ) and 1 with probability W A (1|u 0 ). Proof: We first consider the case where there exists (x 0 , u 0 ) such that W A (x 0 |u 0 ) = 0 orŴ x0u0 =Ŵ x1u1 for some (x 1 , u 1 ) = (x 0 , u 0 ). We assume W A (x 0 |u 0 ) ≤ W A (x 1 |u 1 ) and examine the boxW that is obtained by removing input u 0 .W is obviously local. IfŴ (0|u 1 ) = W (1|u 1 ), the box is independent and doesn't allow for bit commitment. If there is a perfectly correlated or anti-correlated input pair, the box doesn't allow for bit commitment according to Theorem 1. Otherwise bit commitment can be reduced to this box using Protocol I. From Lemma 19 it follows that we can implement bit commitment from W if and only if bit commitment can be implemented fromW . Thus, the claim follows for all boxes with W A (x 0 |u 0 ) = 0 orŴ x0u0 =Ŵ x1u1 for some (x 1 , u 1 ) = (x 0 , u 0 ). In the following we assume
Then the box fulfills Condition 2 and we can securely implement bit commitment using Protocol II.
(2) | extr(conv(Ŵ ))| = 2: We first consider the casê W 1u ,Ŵ 0u ∈ D. Without loss of generality, we can assume u = 0. Then there exist 0 < λ 0 , µ 0 < 1 such that
We define λ 1 := 1−λ 0 and µ 1 := 1−µ 0 . Then it follows from the non-signaling conditions that for all (y, v) ∈ {0, 1} × V
We define
, x ∈ {0, 1},
, x ∈ {0, 1}.
Then it follows from the non-signaling conditions that for all (y, v) ∈ {0, 1} × V it holds that W (0y|0v) + W (1y|0v) is equal to
As we have have excluded the caseŴ 10 =Ŵ 00 , it follows that a 0 + b 0 = a 1 + b 1 = 1. Then the box is local as follows from
for all y, v ∈ {0, 1}. If one of the inputs (0, 0) or (0, 1) is perfectly correlated or anti-correlated, then we cannot reduce bit commitment to this box (Theorem 1). Otherwise we can securely implement bit commitment from this box using Protocol I. Next, we consider the caseŴ x0 ,Ŵ x ′ 1 ∈ D, x, x ′ ∈ {0, 1}. We assume x = x ′ = 0. Then it holds that
If there is u ∈ {0, 1} such that for all v ∈ {0, 1} the box is neither perfectly correlated nor perfectly anti-correlated for input (u, v), then the box fulfills Condition 1. Otherwise, there must be v 0 , v 1 ∈ {0, 1} such that the box is perfectly correlated or anti-correlated for both (0, v 0 ) and (1, v 1 ). Then it follows that λ 00 = 0 and µ 01 = 0, which is a contradiction to our assumptions. The case | extr(conv(Ŵ ))| ≤ 1 we have already excluded.
In order to prove that we can reduce bit commitment to any box with binary outputs (and general input alphabets U and V) that cannot be securely implemented from shared randomness we need to give an alternative condition for the security of Protocol II.
Condition 3.
There exist u 0 , u 1 ∈ U, u 0 = u 1 and x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} such that the following two conditions hold: (1) W x0u0 , W x1u1 are extreme points of conv(Ŵ ), i.e., for all c ∈ {(x 0 , u 0 ), (x 1 , u 1 )} it holds that for all probability distributions P s.t. P (c) = 0
Then for all probability distributions P such that P (c ′ ) > 0 and P (c) = 0 it holds that
To prove Protocol II secure for all boxes that fulfill Condition 3, we replace Lemma 15 with the following lemma. We assume that (x 0 , u 0 ) = (0, 0) and (x 1 , u 1 ) = (0, 1).
then the probability that Bob acceptsz
n is negligible in n.
Proof: For all w n ∈ T n Q,ǫ it holds that |N (xu|w
We distinguish the following two cases:
(1) If there exists u ′ ∈ {0, 1} such that N (u ′ |u n ) ≤ n/2 − k 1 /8, then the statement follows from the proof of Lemma 15. (2) If |n/2 − N (u|u n )| ≤ k 1 /8 for all u ∈ {0, 1}, then it follows from Lemma 7 that with overwhelming probability z n ∈ T n W A ,ǫ (u n ). Assume z n ∈ T Proof: : If |U| ≤ 2, then the statement follows from the proof of Theorem 2. Otherwise, we first eliminate the cases where there exists (x 0 , u 0 ) such that W A (x 0 |u 0 ) = 0 orŴ x0u0 =Ŵ x1u1 for some (x 1 , u 1 ) = (x 0 , u 0 ) by using Lemma 19 to reduce the box. Then we consider D := extr(conv(Ŵ )): In the case |D| = 2 the statement is proven in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2. The case |D| ≥ 3 is a little bit more involved: If there iŝ W 1u ,Ŵ 0u ∈ D, then Condition 2 is fulfilled and we can implement bit commitment using Protocol II. Otherwise, we can either implement bit commitment using Protocol I or for every input u corresponding to an element of D there is an input v for Bob such that the box is perfectly correlated or anti-correlated. LetŴ x0u0 ∈ D. Without loss of generality we assume that W is perfectly correlated for input (u 0 , v 0 ). Then there exist λ z with z:Ŵz ∈D λ z = 1 such that
There exists (x 1 , u 1 ) with u 1 = u 0 such that λ x1u1 > 0. We assume x 0 = x 1 = 0. We have W (10|u 0 v 0 ) = 0. This implies W (00|u 1 v 0 ) = 0. From the non-signaling conditions follows that W (10|u 1 v 0 ) = W (00|u 0 v 0 ) > 0. There exists v 1 ∈ V such that (u 1 , v 1 ) is perfectly correlated or anti-correlated. We assume without loss of generality that (u 1 , v 1 ) is perfectly correlated. This implies W (00|u 1 v 1 ) > 0 and W (10|u 1 v 1 ) = 0. From λ x1u1 > 0 follows that W (10|u 0 v 1 ) > 0. So we haveŴ 0u0 ,Ŵ 0u1 ∈ D, W (10|u 0 v 0 ) = W (10|u 1 v 1 ) = 0, W (10|u 1 v 0 ) > 0 and W (10|u 0 v 1 ) > 0. Thus, Condition 3 is fulfilled.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that any non-signaling two-partite system with binary outputs can either be realized by shared randomness or allows for bit commitment. This all-or-nothing result implies, in particular, that the classical measurement-outcome behavior of a two-qubit state can be used for bit commitment if it has no hidden-variable explanation.
Obvious challenging open questions are whether a similar result holds for arbitrary output alphabets. Furthermore, it would be interesting to know under what circumstances (the stronger functionality of) oblivious transfer can be obtained. In certain settings, e.g., distributed information or noisy channels, bit commitment and oblivious transfer have turned out to be realizable from exactly the same starting points.
